We show that individuals' desire to protect their self-esteem against ego-threatening performance feedback can mitigate moral hazard in environments with subjective performance evaluations. In line with evidence from social psychology and our own laboratory experiment, we assume that agents' react aggressively to evaluations by the principal which do not coincide with their own positive self-perceptions and thereby generate costs of conflict for the principal. We identify conditions for a positive welfare effect of increasing costs of conflict or an increasing sensitivity to ego-threats, and a negative welfare effect of a more informative information technology.
strive for positive self-perceptions because it entails a consumption, signaling and motivational value. Köszegi (2006) , for example, endows individuals with 'ego-utility' and demonstrates the effects on choice between more or less ambitious tasks. In particular, this model explains the phenomenon of overconfidence by individuals who update believes according to Bayes' rule. Bénabou & Tirole (2002) and Compte & Postlewaite (2004) , on the other hand, center on the motivational value of self-confidence. It is argued that confidence in one's ability and efficacy can help individuals to undertake more ambitious goals. When people have imperfect knowledge about their own ability and/or when effort and ability are complements, then more self-confidence enhances peoples' motivation to act [Bénabou & Tirole (2002) : 873].
Psychologists, however, have not only identified the implicit impact of self-esteem on information processing and motivation, but also stress the individual's eagerness to actively maintain and protect positive self-perceptions [Greenwald (1980) , Bushman & Baumeister (1998) , Baumeister (2005) ]. First, people protect their self-esteem by systematically taking credit for success and denying blame for failure. Second, people have a tendency to uncritically accept positive feedback and eagerly search for flaws/faults in other's criticism [e.g. Baumeister (2005), Greenwald (1980) ]. Third and most importantly for our investigation, psychologists have found that conflicts and aggression tend to result from positive self-images that are challenged or threatened [e.g. Baird (1977) , Raskin et al (1991) , Bushman & Baumeister (1998) ]. It is argued that hostile aggression is an expression of the self's rejection of egothreatening evaluations received from other people [e.g. Baumeister et al (1996) ]. People with high self-esteem usually hold confident and highly favorable ideas about themselves, i.e. they exhibit ego-involvement, and react belligerently to ego-threatening feedback from others [Baird (1977) , Shrauger & Lund (1975) and Korman (1969) ].
In this paper we formalize these findings and analyze the impact of aggressive reactions to ego-threatening feedback on principal-agent relationships. More specifically, we show how the individuals' desire to protect their self-esteem facilitates/can explain the existence of contractual relationships in environments with unobservable effort and subjective performance measures. Note, we concentrate on situations in which neither effort nor output can be measured objectively as these constitute exactly the settings in which disagreements about effort and performance (and corresponding ego-threats) can arise. In addition to our theoretical analysis, we report the results of a laboratory experiment in which we test the behavioral assumptions underlying our theoretical specification of behavior in environments with subjective performance evaluations.
In reality, it is very often impossible to objectively measure workers' and especially managers' individual contributions to the success of projects. Therefore it is widely prevalent to (also) take into account subjective evaluations in performance pay. Already in 1981 the Bureau of National Affairs reports, for example, that pay for performance systems involv-ing subjective measures are more common than those involving only objective performance signals. Furthermore, Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) and Levine (2003) cite more recent evidence on the wide usage of subjective performance appraisal systems in performance pay in e.g. investment banks, law firms and consultancies.
Our paper considers the following set-up. A principal wants to motivate an agent to spend effort on a complex good or service. Neither the agent's effort nor the outcome of the project (the quality of the good or service) is publicly observable. However, the principal and the agent receive private, i.e. subjective, signals about the effort of the agent. These signals are imperfectly correlated with each other and to the actual effort level. To motivate the agent to spend positive effort, a contract has to specify payments which increase in the subjective signal of the principal (an increase in the reported signal of the agent would just motivate him to misrepresent his information). However, due to the imperfect signal technology the principal can credibly report that he has received a signal of low effort regardless of his actual private information. As payments increase in the subjective signal of the principal, he is always better off by misrepresenting positive information and paying the agent the minimum wage. This will be anticipated by the agent and subgame -perfect equilibrium efforts are zero, i.e. no principal agent relationship can be established.
In a recent paper MacLeod (2003) shows how principal-agent relations can be established on the basis of subjective performance evaluations if the principal can credibly promise to make payments to a third party (contingent on the signal configuration). In the simplest case of two different performance signals, the optimal contract fixes a payment from the principal to a third party if she pays the agent according to a bad signal and the agent reports a good signal which satisfies the principal's truthtelling constraint. The complete flexibility of third-party payments thereby ensures that a relationship (i.e. a positive effort level) can be established regardless of the parameters of the model (e.g. the correlation between the principal's and the agent's signal, the size of the project etc.). Of course this result crucially depends on the credibility of payments to the third party. In particular, while the principal cannot credibly promise the agent to report his signal truthfully, it is assumed that he can make such a promise to the third party.
In contrast to Macleod (2003) we show in this paper that a principal-agent relationship can also be established on the basis of subjective performance evaluations, if the agent tries to defend his self-esteem through the creation of conflict or aggressive actions. In line with the aforementioned psychological evidence, we assume that the agent perceives a negative psychological payoff from ego-threatening performance evaluations by the principal. He suffers from bad performance evaluations by the principal, whenever she does not share his opinion based on his own subjective signal. The agent can reduce his negative psychological payoff through conflict/trouble imposed on the principal, e.g. the agent goes to court in order to enforce the bonus payment, steals, or refuses to cooperate on other tasks. 1 If the agent creates trouble, the principal will face costs of conflict. 2 The costs of conflict play the very same role as MacLeod (2003)'s third-party payments -they enforce truth-telling by the principal. In our setting, however, costs of conflict are not at the principal's disposal but rather depend on the agent's sensitivity to ego-threats, the quality of the information technology etc.. Our analysis identifies conditions on conflict levels, project returns, the quality of information, and the sensitivity to ego-threats which promote or rule-out the implementation of positive equilibrium effort levels. In particular, we identify conditions for a positive welfare effect of increasing costs of conflict or increasing sensitivity to ego-threats, and a negative welfare effect of a more informative information technology. Finally, we present the results of a controlled and incentivized experiment conducted in the laboratory of the Center of Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen in June 2009. In this experiment we test the behavioral assumptions that we make on the basis of the psychological literature. In synthesis: the experiment consists of a real-effort task in which performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Every participant working on the task (agent) gets subjective performance feedback from another participant (principal) that can observe how he/she works on the task. Agents are subsequently given the opportunity to react to the feedback of the principals. In support of our assumptions regarding psychological costs of ego-threatening performance feedback, results indicate that people's reactions to subjective performance feedback strongly depend on their own self-perceptions. People react negatively towards subjective performance feedback which is below their self-perception, but accept subjective feedback which confirms/is higher than their own evaluation.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present the principal-agent relation and the psychological payoff structure. As a benchmark, Section 3 analyzes the 1 Note, all that counts is that these conflicts are anticipated as costs by the principal. 2 This mechanism could be interpreted as negative reciprocity. Unlike the existing models of reciprocity [e.g., Rabin (1993) , Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk & Fischbacher (2006) ], however, what is considered psychologically costly in our model does not depend on beliefs about strategies and their associated outcomes, but rather on (reported) signal constellations.
situation of pure moral hazard and determines the optimal effort choice and comparative statics of social welfare in the absence of binding truth-telling constraints. Section 4 continues with an analysis of the impact of binding truth-telling constraints on optimal effort choice and social welfare. In section 5 we will present our laboratory experiment and results. Section 6 concludes with some remarks on the practical implications of our model and its robustness.
The model
In this section we introduce the principal-agent relationship and present a psychological payoff structure which captures the empirical evidence on self-esteem and ego-threats from social psychology. Furthermore we characterize the first best solution and present auxiliary results on the agent's decision on conflict creation and the optimality of simple bonus contracts.
Production Technology
Assume there is a risk-neutral principal, P , who decides upon undertaking a project which generates a value of φ > 0 if successful. The project requires effort of an agent, A. Assume that if the agent spends effort p ∈ [0, 1], the project will be successful (create value φ) with probability p. The project is a complex good or service and its success is not verifiable, i.e. contracts contingent on the generation of φ are not feasible.
Information Technology
Neither principal nor agent can directly observe whether the project is successful or not. Rather, both form an opinion about the agent's performance during the production process. I.e., they receive private signals about the agent's performance.
The principal receives s P ∈ S P , where S P = {L, H}, i.e. the principal's opinion can be such that he regards the agent's performance as either high (H) or low (L). Analogously, the agent receives s A ∈ S A with S A = {L, H}. The signals s P and s A are non-verifiable private pieces of information of the principal and the agent, respectively.
The signals are informative with respect to the success of the project. If the project is not successful (which happens with probability (1 − p)), principal and agent receive the signal
If the project is successful, the principal receives the signal s P = H with probability g, the agent receives the same signal with probability ρ and receives s A = H as an independent signal with probability x. Hence, g measures the quality of the principal's signal, ρ indicates the correlation between the agent's and the principal's signal -or the counter-probability of an independent judgment -and x quantifies the quality of the agent's signal if he forms an independent judgment (i.e., we adopt the specification of the information technology in Mcleod (2003) , p.228).
Assumption 1. Information Technology
We assume that the principal's and the agent's signal are imperfect, i.e., g ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0, 1), and positively but imperfectly correlated, i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1).
We denote by γ kl the conditional probability that s P = k and s A = l given that the project is a success. Then, the ex-ante probability for the signal pair s P = L and s A = H, for instance, will be pγ LH 
The Game The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal offers a contract to the agent and the agent decides upon acceptance.
Upfront payments are arranged.
2. The agent decides upon effort p.
3. The project generates value φ with probability p. 
Psychological Payoffs
The agent is risk-neutral and senses a psychological payoff that depends on his opinion about his own performance, s A , and the reported opinion of the principal, t P . More specifically, the agent's utility function reads:
Thereby, w denotes the wage payment, Y (t P , s A ) represents the agent's psychological payoff for a given configuration of (reported) signals, q is the level of conflict (or retaliation) created by the agent and c(q) is the agent's cost for the level of conflict q with c ∈ C 2 , c(0) = 0, c (0) = 0, c (q) > 0 and lim q→1 c (q) = ∞. 3 All γ kl as functions of g, ρ, and x can be found in Appendix 8.1.
We continue with a specification of Y (t P , s A ) which tries to capture the empirical evidence from social psychology on self-esteem, ego-threats, and retaliatory behavior. Principal In contrast to the agent, the principal only cares about his profit
Assumption 2. Psychological Costs
where pφ is the expected benefit generated by the agent, E {w} are the expected wage cost of employing the agent, and E {q} ψ are the expected costs of conflict due to retaliation. As our assumptions on c(q) ensure that q ∈ [0, 1], we can interpret q as the probability with which the agent creates costs of ψ > 0 for the principal. First best profits are given by
Contracts In our setting with unobservable effort and subjective measures of performance, a contract Γ can only be contingent on the reported subjective opinions of the principal and the agent. Hence, a contract fixes payments for all configurations of reports t P and
The agent accepts a contract if he expects a (weakly) positive utility from it (individual rationality) and chooses p as to maximize his utility (incentive compatibility). If a contract Γ is individually rational and the agent chooses effort p, we say that Γ implements p. Principal and agent report their opinions, i.e. signals, truthfully if and only if they weakly benefit from doing so.
Cost Minimizing Contracts
How do optimal contracts look like given that effort is unobservable, performance measures are subjective and agents try to protect a positive self-image through the creation of conflict? A standard application of the revelation principle implies that we can restrict ourselves to simple bonus contracts without any loss of generality.
Lemma 2. Reduced Form Contracts
Suppose there exists a contract Γ which implements p > 0. Then, there always exists a contract
Γ which implements p at weakly lower costs and (i) Principal and agent tell the truth.
(ii)
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
For convenience, we define
The principal's objective to offer a profit maximizing contract -i.e., an optimal combination of a fixed payment and a bonus -is burdened with (i) moral hazard as the agent's effort is unobservable and (ii) a truth-telling problem as the principal has to credibly commit herself to a truthful revelation of his own signal. 5 In the next sections we will first analyze the pure moral hazard problem (i.e., the case of non-binding truth-telling constraints) and then proceed with an analysis of the truthtelling problem.
Pure Moral Hazard Problem
In this section we abstract from the truthtelling problem inherent to the principal-agent relationship in order to analyze the isolated impact of moral hazard on the optimal effort level chosen by the principal and social welfare. Hence, we assume throughout this section that the contract Γ = (f, b) guarantees truth-telling (i.e., truth-telling constraints are nonbinding).
Incentive Compatibility For a given contract Γ = (f, b), the agent chooses effort p as to maximize his utility (see Eqn. 1) while anticipating the generation of ex-post conflict at level q * as depicted in Lemma 1. This means, he maximizes
which induces the first order condition 6
Note that
= v (p) > 0 such that the agent's optimization problem is well-behaved.
Eqn. (3) shows that the incentive compatible bonus that the principal pays to the agent in case he beliefs that the agent did a good job has to overcome marginal effort costs and marginal psychological costs. If the principal wants to induce a positive effort level, he has to offer a positive bonus. Note, however, that the required bonus does not vanish in the limit of small efforts, because marginal psychological costs do not vanish for p = 0. Finally, observe that the incentive compatible bonus increases in target effort p, psychological costs Y , and the conditional probability of conflict (γ LH ). In particular, a higher quality of the principal's signal g reduces the incentive compatible bonus because the agent expects higher returns to effort and the probability of conflict decreases. Likewise, a lower correlation of the signals or a higher probability of a positive independent evaluation by the agent enhances the compensation requested by the agent for a given effort level.
Individual Rationality The agent accepts a contract Γ = (f, b) whenever his expected utility from it is weakly positive, i.e.
To maximize her profits, the principal sets the upfront payment for a given bonus b to
Observe that the upfront-payment can well be negative (i.e., a franchise fee) as the agent is not protected by limited liability. Note in particular that f (b) can always be fixed such that the agent does not receive any rents from the relationship.
What are the principal's costs to implement an effort level p > 0 on the basis of these incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints?
. Note that C(p) is convex and that C(0) = 0. We adopt the convention that an effort p > 0 which is not implementable requires infinite costs.
Optimal Effort The principal's profit now reads
which is zero for p = 0 and concave for p > 0. We denote the maximum of Π(p) on [0, 1] by p and the corresponding profit for the principal byΠ 7 and derive the following set of results.
Proposition 1. Pure Moral Hazard
(ii) Suppose φ > φ. Then, dp dφ > 0, dp dψ < 0, dp dg > 0, dp dρ > 0, and dp dx < 0. the value of the project certainly enhances marginal benefits and therebyp. Likewise, higher costs of conflict for the principal enhance marginal costs and lower the optimal effort level.
A higher quality of the principal's signal reduces the probability of conflict which reduces marginal costs and leads to higher optimal effort levels. A higher correlation of signals or a lower quality of an independent judgment have a similar effect as they also result in lower expected conflict levels and a lower compensation of psychological costs.
As indicated in Part (iii), these intuitive effects also carry over to the comparative statics of the principal's profit. The higher the value of the project and the lower expected costs associated with the retaliation of the agent, the more profit is awarded to the principal.
In particular, the principal gains from a decrease in retaliation costs ψ, an increase in the principal's signal quality g (which reduces the probability of conflict), an increase in the signal correlation ρ and a decrease in the probability that the agent receives an independent signal
x.
As the agent does not receive any rents in the optimal contract, the principal's profit also measures the surplus of the relationship. Hence, in the case of non-binding truth-telling constraints, conflicts (i.e. their likelihood γ LH and size q * Ψ) as well as the agent's psychological sensitivity Y only have a welfare detrimental effect. Therefore, any property of the information technology which reduces conflict (i.e. an increase in g or ρ) is welfare-enhancing, while an increase in the quality of the agent's independent judgment x induces the adverse effect.
In this section we have abstracted from the truthtelling problem, i.e. we have concentrated on the case of non-binding truthtelling constraints, to isolate the impact of moral hazard. In
the following section, we analyze the robustness of these findings in the presence of truthtelling constraints.
Truth-Telling Problem
With a contract as characterized in Lemma 2(ii), the agent is indifferent between all possible reports as his payment (and also his psychological payoff) will be unaffected by his own reporting decision. Hence, we can safely adopt the convention that the agent always tells the truth. This given, the principal's profit contingent on the agent's and her own report can be represented in the following table (with the principal's report depicted in the rows and the agent's report (and signal) depicted in the columns).
Suppose s P = H. Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoff from doing so (which reads pφ − f − b) is larger than his payoff from reporting t P = L (which reads
The principal can only credibly promise a bonus b below b max . Note that this upper bound to credible bonuses increases in the signal correlation ρ and in the quality of an independent judgment x. An increase in each of these parameters lowers the probability of the configuration s P = H and s A = L in which case the principal could cheat without facing retaliation and therefore reduces the incentive to save the bonus payment. Moreover, b max certainly increases in the level of conflict q * ψ. However, the maximal credible bonus is independent of g as the principal is only tempted to lie if he received a positive signal.
If s P = L, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoff from doing so (which reads
is larger than his payoff from reporting t P = H (which
The principal can also not promise to pay arbitrarily low bonuses as he has an incentive to evade conflict through 'unconditional bonuses'. By paying the bonus independently of his signal, the principal avoids any conflict with an agent who is prepared to protect his positive self-image. The minimal credible bonus is thereby decreasing in the signal correlation ρ and increasing in the quality of an independent judgment x because the larger ρ and the smaller x the smaller is the probability of the configuration s A = H and s P = L in which case the principal would benefit from conflict evasion. Similarly to b max , b min is independent of g.
Note in particular that b max > b min > 0 and that the difference between b max and b min gets larger and the respective interval is shifted towards larger bonuses as q * or ψ increases. Hence, the larger the potential conflict level, the higher are the bonuses that can be implemented.
In fact, for every bonus b there is a conflict level ψ such that b is credible. 8 While elevated levels of conflict were only welfare detrimental in the pure moral hazard case, i.e. the case of non-binding truthtelling constraints (see Proposition 1), they relax the upper-and tighten the lower threshold of credible bonuses.
Implementable Efforts We call a certain effort level
Furthermore, we define the minimum implementable effort p min and the maximum implementable effort p max implicitly by b min = b(p min ) and b max = b(p max ).
Optimal Effort Level
We denote the maximum of
by p * . p * will be referred to as the optimal effort level (p * is the optimal effort level for the principal given that only effort levels between p min and p max are feasible) and Π * = Π(p * ) will be the corresponding profit for the principal. 
Lemma 3. Truth-Telling Constraints
(i) dp min dΨ > 0 and dp max dΨ > 0.
(ii) dp max dg > 0 and dp min dg > 0. (iii) dp max dρ > 0 and dp min dρ < 0 if ψ is sufficiently large. (iv) dp max dx > 0 and dp min dx > 0 if ψ is sufficiently large. (i) ). Intuitively, the more conflict, the less tempting it is to cheat on the agent (upper truth-telling constraint) and the more tempting it is to evade conflict through unconditional bonus-payments (lower truth-telling constraint).
In contrast, a higher quality of the principal's signal g lowers the incentive compatible bonus b(p) but leaves b min and b max unaltered. Hence, the better the principal's signal, the less costly is the implementation of a certain effort level and the higher is the maximal implementable effort p max . However, lower costs of effort implementation also increase the minimal effort level that can credibly be implemented (p min ) (Part (ii)).
In contrast to this, the impact of ρ and x on p min and p max is more subtle (see Parts Second, the lower truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in particular the case for small project values which are sufficiently attractive to sign contracts on small positive effort levels but operate with bonus payments which tempt the principal to evade conflict by paying the bonus unconditional on the signal. In this case, the principal suffers from parameter changes which tighten the lower truthtelling constraint. For instance, the higher the quality of the principal's signal g, the larger p min and the more tight the lower truthtelling constraint.
In contrast, an increase in g enhances the principal's profit for a given effort level. According to Proposition 3(ii) the latter (direct) effect may well be dominated by the former (indirect) effect. As a consequence, a better signal for the principal may be welfare detrimental in the case of small projects for which the lower truth-telling constraint is tight.
Note that similar detrimental effects cannot be derived for the correlation of signals ρ, as a higher correlation directly enhances the principal's profit and relaxes the lower and the upper truthtelling constraint as long as ψ is sufficiently large (see Lemma 3(iii)).
Finally, we compare equilibrium profits with the first best solution and discuss the limit of a perfect signal to the principal, perfectly correlated signals, and no correct independent judgment of the agent. (1−ρ)x 1−ρx q * ψ does not vanish as long as ρ < 1 and x > 0, the first best effort can be too large or too small to be implementable. Hence, it requires a 'fine-tuning' of φ (relative to expected costs of conflict) to guarantee a first best solution in this case.
Proposition 4. First Best Comparison

Experiment
In this section we present the set-up and results of a controlled and incentivized experiment designed to test the assumptions that we make in our model with regard to the agent's motivation. Remember, based on the evidence from psychology we assume that people react negatively towards subjective performance feedback which is lower than their own self-perceptions and accept feedback which is confirming/higher than their own evaluations.
Our experiment took place in June 2009 in the laboratory of the Center for Experimental
Economics at the University of Copenhagen. In total 86 people participated in 4 sessions.
On average participants took 45 minutes to complete the experiment and received about 120
DKK (about 16 Euros).
In this section we will first describe the experimental setup and procedure before we present the results.
Experimental Setup and Procedure
In the beginning of the experiment all participants were randomly assigned to one of two different roles, Person A and Person B, and grouped into pairs. Each pair was consisting of a Person A and a Person B. Participants were provided with a description of the game, the possible choices that players in the different roles could make and their associated consequences (see also the experimental instructions in the appendix).
The whole experiment was divided into four different stages: i) control questions, ii) clickingtask, iii) evaluation and feedback and iv) reaction.
In stage i) all participants had to correctly answer a set of control questions before being able to proceed.
In stage ii) players in the role of Person B had to work on a real-effort task. The real-effort task consisted of clicking away boxes. More specifically, for a period of 90 seconds screens with boxes appeared for various time lengths and Person B's task was to click the boxes away.
Person A was be able to observe on his/her screen how Person B was working on the task. This means, Person A saw the same screen as Person B and could observe him/her clicking away the boxes. The percentage of boxes clicked away during the clicking task determined the payoff of Person A. Note, in the instructions we informed participants about the payoff scheme. 9 We told them: 10 • If Person B clicks away 0-20% of the boxes that appeared during the 90 sec., Person A gets 200 points.
• If Person B clicks away 20-40% of the boxes that appeared during the 90 sec., Person A gets 300 points.
• If Person B clicks away 40-60% of the boxes that appeared during the 90 sec., Person A gets 400 points.
• If Person B clicks away 60-80% of the boxes that appeared during the 90 sec., Person A gets 500 points.
• If Person B clicks away 80-100% of the boxes that appeared during the 90 sec., Person A gets 600 points.
In the evaluation and feedback stage, following the clicking-task, both players were asked • If Person A's feedback is 20-40%, then Person B receives 150 points from Person A.
• If Person A's feedback is 40-60%, then Person B receives 200 points from Person A.
• If Person A's feedback is 60-80%, then Person B receives 250 points from Person A.
• If Person A's feedback is 80-100%, then Person B receives 300 points from Person A.
Note, when Person A was giving feedback the objective performance of Person B was unknown to the participants. They only had private signals about B's performance. Hence, participants did not know the true payoff that Person B had generated for Person A in the clicking-task. They knew, however, that independent of all decisions payoffs could never be negative (see also the experimental instructions in the appendix).
Following stage iii), in the reaction stage, iv), Person B was able to react to Person A's feedback by reducing Person A's payoff by up to 100 points. More specifically, we used the 9 As can also be seen in the instructions, payoffs in the experiment were expressed in points during the experiment. Participants were informed in the beginning of the experiment that points were exchanged into Danish crowns at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10 points = 3.5 DKK 10 Note, participants were told at the beginning of the experiments that category 0-20% meant ¡20, 20-40% meant 20 to ¡40, 40-60% meant 40 to ¡60 etc. Note that all participants were fully informed ex-ante about everything explained above.
They were e.g. informed about all possible choices that players had throughout the experiment and the associated payoff consequences. Furthermore they were informed about the fact that This concludes the description of the experimental set-up. In the next section we will present our experimental results.
Results
To recapitulate, on the basis of the psychological literature we make the assumption in our model that agents (B-Persons) react negatively towards subjective feedback from principals (A-Persons) that is lower than their self-perception. However, agents do not react negatively towards feedback that is confirming their self-perceptions or higher. In our experiment with subjective performance evaluations an agent reacts negatively towards a principal (Person A) following a certain feedback by reducing the principal's payoff by up to 100 points.
Given this, the question is: do reactions of agents depend upon their own self-perceptions? Furthermore do they react negatively towards feedback which is lower than their own selfperception and do they accept feedback which is confirming or higher?
To answer these questions we look at two different dimensions of the agents' reactions: i) intensity and ii) frequency. Intensity refers to the amount of points that Person B reduces We look first at the intensity of Person B's reaction.
[Insert Table 1] From Table 1 [Insert Table 2]   Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for these two variables. One can see that there are 43 observations for both variables belonging to the 43 B-Persons in our experiment.
The mean 'Avgpunbelow' is 39.7 points and the mean 'Avgpunishequalabove' is 8.8 points.
Furthermore, observations of 'Avgpunbelow' and 'Avgpunishequalabove' respectively range from 0-100 points and 0-65 points.
As a first test we look at the distribution of those two variables. In case self-perceptions have an impact on the reactions of B-Persons, the distributions of the two variables, 'Avgpunbelow' and 'Avgpunequalabove', should not be the same. Hence, we use the Wilcoxon sign rank test to analyze this: [Insert Table 3] As can be seen from Table 3 , the result is: we can reject the Null-hypothesis that the two distributions are the same. The z-value is 4.498 meaning that we have a probability of observing these two samples given that they come from the same distribution of less then 1%.
Obviously the behavioral assumption that we make in our theory not only implies that the distribution of these two variables is different, but that the median of the variable 'Avgpunbelow' is significantly different from zero, whereas the median of the variable 'Avgpunequalabove' is not. We test this by running a median regression.
[Insert Table 4 and 5]
The estimated parameter of the constant in Tables 4 and 5 correspond to the estimated median. One can test the null that this parameter is 0 against the alternative that it is greater than zero using the estimated standard error reported in the table. If the ratio of the estimated median to the estimated standard error is e.g. greater than 1.64, then one can reject the Null-hypothesis that the median is 0 and conclude that it is greater than zero at a 5% significance level. As can be seen in Table 3 , using this method we cannot reject the Null-hypothesis that 'Avgpunequalabove' is equal zero. Furthermore, we can reject the Null-hypothesis that 'Avgpunbelow' is equal to zero. The estimated constant is 30 and the standard deviation is 11.74609 giving a ratio of 2.5540 which is greater than 1.64.
Hence, the results represent evidence in line with our theory.
In a second step we look at the frequency of B-Persons reactions. This is important because a large part of the difference between the variables 'Avgpunbelow' and 'Avgpunequalabove' might stem from the fact that B-Persons react less negatively the higher Person A's feedback level independent of their own self-perceptions. When looking at frequencies we treat all amounts equally and only concentrate on the question whether Person B reacts or not. The frequency of reaction is, thus, a much stronger indicator for differences in Person B's reaction behavior below and above his self perception.
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 1] Similar to the analysis in Table 1, in Table 6 we report the frequencies with which BPersons with certain self-perceptions ('own evaluations') negatively react to different feedback levels by Person A. Note, in Table 1 it was the amount of points that we looked at. Here, in Table 6 , we report the frequency of negative reactions independent of the amounts. One can see e.g. that on average 57.1429% of B-Persons with an own evaluation of 20-40% react negatively towards a feedback of 0-20%. Furthermore, 81.125% of B-persons with an own evaluation of 40-60% react negatively towards a feedback of 20-40%. In analogy to our finding from Tabel 1, the higher Person B's self-perception, the more likely he/she is to negatively react towards any given feedback level of Person A below own evaluation. Furthermore, the frequency of negative reactions seems to drop significantly at feedback levels as high as own evaluations. Figure 1 presents the frequency data of Table 6 graphically. Two things become evident 1. the 'frequency of negative reactions' for every feedback decreases the lower B-Persons' self-perceptions ('own evaluation').
2. there seems to be a significant drop in the 'frequency of negative reaction' around feedback levels that equal own selv-perceptions.
To analyze this further, we report the frequency of reactions/no reactions for feedback levels below and equal/above self-perceptions in Table 6 and use a Fisher exact test to determine how likely it is that these frequencies are the same [Insert Table 6] The p-value indicates the total probability of observing data as extreme or more extreme if the Null-hypothesis, i.e. all values are equal, is true. As can easily be seen, the Nullhypothesis is rejected in our case. The probability of observing the reaction frequencies as reported in Table 6 given that they are actually the same is less then 1%. This provides strong evidence in line with our theory. The frequency of negative reactions significantly depends upon whether a feedback is below Person B's self perceptions or equal/above.
Concluding: in line with our theory, self-perceptions significantly influence people's reactions to subjective performance feedback. The analysis in this section has shown that both, the intensity of reactions as well as the frequency, significantly depend upon people's self evaluations. More specifically, people's negative reaction towards subjective performance feedback which is lower than their self-perception is significantly different from zero. In contrast to this, their negative reaction towards subjective performance feedback which is confirming or higher than their self-perception is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, people are much more likely to negatively react towards subjective performance feedback which is lower than their self-perception compared to feedback equal or higher than their own evaluation of their performance.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of our model revealed that self-esteem and the individual's eagerness to protect it may facilitate principal-agent relationships even if performance signals are subjective and no third-party can enforce truth-telling. In particular, we analyzed the impact of the conflict level, the psychological sensitivity to ego-threats, and the quality of the information technology on optimal effort levels and social welfare.
Conflict Level Conflict as modelled in this paper unambiguously reduces optimal effort levels and social welfare in the absence of truth-telling constraints. In the presence of truthtelling constraints, however, we demonstrate that some conflict potential is needed to establish a positive effort by the agent and that enhanced conflict levels have a positive effect on social welfare in the case of valuable projects which require substantial bonus payments to the agent.
Hence, a well-functioning (internal or external) processing of appeals against managerial decision making is not only providing a more peaceful workforce, it may also implement the conflict level needed to make bonus payments credible and thereby raise firm profits.
Sensitivity to Ego-Threats Higher levels of conflict unambiguously raise the maximum credible bonus and thereby relax the upper truthtelling constraint in a potentially welfare enhancing way. In contrast, the impact of psychological sensitivity to ego threats is more subtle.
First of all, some sensitivity is needed to establish the prospect of conflict for the principal and thereby ensure truthtelling. The more aggressive the agent reacts to ego-threats, the higher the anticipated level of conflict and the less restrictive the upper truthtelling constraint. Hence, a more aggressive agent will induce a welfare improvement in case of valuable projects with associated high bonus payments as discussed above. However, the higher the sensitivity of the agent, the larger the required compensation for anticipated psychological costs. This ceteris paribus enhances necessary bonus payments for a given effort level and thereby reduces the principal's profit and social welfare. The ideal agent from the point of view of a principal who wishes to conduct a very valuable project is therefore someone who reacts very aggressively to ego-threats (i.e., who has low costs of retaliation) but does not suffer too much from an ego-threat and the corresponding retaliation (e.g., because q * is large). This reinforces our above-made appraisal of appeal systems and suggests to ensure low costs of conflict creation for the employee (e.g., low costs of law suits etc.). Note, however, that these recommendations only hold for very valuable projects which make the upper truthtelling constraint binding. For non-binding truthtelling constraints, psychological sensitivity and the corresponding conflict remains detrimental to the principal's profits and welfare.
Information Technology Moreover, we analyzed the impact of the information technology on optimal efforts and welfare. First of all, the principal is advised to use a signal technology which displays a perfectly correlated signal to her and the agent. With perfectly correlated signals the probability of conflicting signals is zero such that the agent does not expect any psychological costs. Moreover, the lower (upper) truthtelling constraint is decreasing (increasing) in the signal correlation such that the interval of credible bonuses is maximized for a given conflict level. Whenever the first best bonus is credible, perfectly correlated signals will allow the agent to implement a first best. This lends support to the practice of using information for performance evaluation which is not necessarily highly correlated with actual performance but ensures a high correlation with the agent's self-assessment. Similarly, the probability of conflict will be zero if the agent does not observe good performance independent of the principal. Hence, a first best can also be achieved with agents who lack an informative independent judgement (i.e., x = 0). However, both truthtelling constraints are decreasing in x, such that implementability of the first best is less straightforward for x = 0 than for perfectly correlated signals.
The impact of the quality of the principal's signal has shown to be subtle. A better signal reduces necessary bonus payments (due to higher expected returns and lower psychological costs for the agent) and thereby lowers agency costs which yields a welfare improvementunless the lower truthtelling constraint binds, which may be the case for less valuable projects.
Hence, the principal cannot expect higher profits from employing a better information technology regardless of project values. As a consequence he will not always choose a perfect information technology even if this is costless. The optimal choice of an information technology rather deals with a tradeoff between agency costs (which are decreasing in the signal quality) and truthtelling constraints (which may well be tightened by a better information technology). 
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The conditional probabilities γ k,l for signal configuration (
Proof of Lemma 2
To save on notation, we denote
Part(i).
For a given contract Γ and signals s P and s A , the principal and the agent decide upon their report. Let σ P : S P → Δ(S P ) and σ A : S A → Δ(S A ) be the principal's and agent's reporting strategies (i.e., mappings from the set of signals S P and S A to the set of probability distributions over S P and S A , respectively). Suppose that (σ * P , σ * A ) is the pair of optimal reporting strategies for contract Γ. Then, the revelation principle implies that there exists a contractΓ which implements the same effort at the same costs and induces truthful reports by principal and agent. We will, henceforth, restrict our analysis to this type of (revelation) contracts.
Part (ii).
Suppose that Γ = {w kl } is a revelation contract, i.e., the principal and the agent tell the truth under contract Γ. As Γ implements p > 0, the incentive compatibility
is satisfied. Consider a contractΓ which fixes payments ofŵ k = l∈S A w kl P r{s P = k, s A = l} if the principal receives signal s P = k, i.e., payments are independent of s A . These payments also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see above). 11 Moreover, the agent weakly benefits from telling the truth. Finally, the principal's truth-telling constraint is also satisfied underΓ. To see this observe that the principal reports k given that he has received k under contract Γ if
for all o ∈ S P (where (q * ψ) t A ,t P denotes the anticipated conflict costs for a reported configuration (t A , t P )). This set of inequalities holds because Γ implements truth-telling by assumption.
Γ implements truth-telling if
holds for all o, k ∈ S P . Insertingŵ k andŵ o yields
which coincides with Eqs. 6 and therefore shows that forΓ the principal's truthtelling constraint is satisfied as well. Hence, any revelation contract Γ can be substituted by a revelation contractΓ with w kl independent of l which also implements p > 0 and leaves the principal weakly better off.
Part (iii).
Suppose by contradiction that Γ implements p > 0 with w H = g and w L = g + with ≥ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be written as
Observe that the numerator of the rhs is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly negative. Hence, the rhs is strictly negative and the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied for any ≥ 0. A contradiction.
Comparative Statics of Bonuses
implies the following results.
Lemma 4. Comparative Statics of b(p)
The definition of b min and b max (iii) Follows from Δb = (v) , and (vi) follow directly from Eqs 4 and 5. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Part(i). Consider Π(p) = pφ − pγ LH q * ψ − C(p) with C(p) = v(p) + pγ LH ((1 − q * )Y + c(q * )). Observe that Π = ap − v(p) with a = φ − γ LH (q * Ψ + ((1 − q * )Y + c(q * ))). Recall that v(0) = 0, v(
Part (ii).
We use the first order condition dΠ dp
as an implicit function ofp. With we get dp dφ
which implies Part (ii) (recall that 
Proof of Proposition 2
⇐ Suppose φ > φ. As 
Proof of Lemma 3
p min is implicitly given by
and p max is implicitly given by
We use these equations to compute the comparative statics of p min and p max . To be specific, 
Proof of Proposition 3
The impact of a parameter y on equilibrium profits Π(p * ) can be denoted by > 0 for all φ >φ ≡ max (φ , φ ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i). Follows from C(p) > v(p) for every p > 0. 
Part (ii) and (iii)
.
